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Know Your Client: The Mundane Case
of Wiggins v. Smith
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2002 case Bell v. Cone,' the United States Supreme
Court denied postconviction relief to a defendant whose counsel
elected not to make a final plea for the defendant's life before the
jury entered into deliberations. 2 Read broadly, Bell v. Cone raised
concerns that if counsel could legitimately waive final argument,
counsel could possibly waive other crucial opportunities to advo-
cate for the defendant - opening statement, cross-examination of
the prosecution's key witness - without violating the defendant's
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. These
concerns were validated by other opinions that suggested counsel
could be effective even if intoxicated, inebriated, or asleep during
portions of capital sentencing cases.3 With the propriety of such
seemingly egregious deficiencies settled, only a Supreme Court
decision that harangued lower courts for condoning unreasonable
performance by appointed counsel would likely rectify the state of
the law.
In the 2003 term, the Supreme Court agreed to hear another
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Wiggins v. Smith.4 How-
ever, this claim was not based on the performance of an intoxi-
cated or sleeping attorney. Rather, the Court agreed to hear a case
1. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
2. Id. at 701-02.
3. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Artuz, 113 F. Supp. 2d 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (refus-
ing to presume prejudice where defense counsel was asleep during portions of
the trial); Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 28147 (4th
Cir. Oct. 21, 1992) (refusing to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel after the defendant discovered that trial counsel abused alcohol and co-
caine during the trial); Frye v. Lee, 89 F. Supp. 2d 693 (W.D.N.C. 2000)
(holding that counsel's use of alcohol during the trial was not relevant to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
4. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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of appointed counsel who failed to sufficiently investigate a defen-
dant's background prior to trial.5 The specific facts of the case re-
vealed that counsel knew some - but not all - of the details of the
defendant's background prior to selecting an argument to make at
the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court not only agreed to
hear this rather mundane ineffective assistance of counsel case,
but also decided the case in the defendant's favor.6
The Court's denial of relief in Cone after a seemingly egre-
gious error by counsel, juxtaposed against the Court's willingness
to grant relief to Wiggins, has brought into question the standards
by which appointed counsel will be judged. On one side of the de-
bate over the case's impact stand those who think that Wiggins
will have a profound effect on the way capital sentences are re-
viewed.7 These individuals read Wiggins as establishing that
courts can no longer "dismiss claims of ineffectiveness lightly by
characterizing the failure to present mitigation as a 'strategy.'"8
These individuals say that the guidance provided by the Court
"may result in fewer incompetent investigations of mitigating evi-
dence." 9 At the very least, "it's going to be much harder for review-
ing courts to ignore the results" of capital sentencing cases than it
was before Wiggins. 10
On the other side of the debate stand those who feel that Wig-
gins is very fact-specific and nothing more than an application of
the Supreme Court's test for ineffective assistance of counsel as
established in the 1984 decision, Strickland v. Washington."
Commenting on the effect of Wiggins, the Maryland Solicitor Gen-
eral said: "It's not a case that changes anything .... It just applies
Strickland, the clearly established law."12 A representative from
the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation believes that the presump-
tion of effective assistance as established in Strickland will still
5. Id. at 515-16.
6. Id. at 535.
7. Ira Mickenberg, 2002-2003 Term: Supreme Court Review: Criminal
Cases, THE NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 2003, at 9.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Charles Lane, Death Penalty of Md. Man is Overturned, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2003, at A01.
11. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Orders New Sentence for Maryland
Death Row Inmate, THE DAILY REC. (Baltimore), June 27, 2003.
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require courts to defer to counsel's decisions in most claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 13
Even though Wiggins emphasizes the reasonableness of coun-
sel's investigation in the analysis of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims, Wiggins does not represent a change in the test for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, Wiggins stands as a
strict application of Strickland. However, the Court's willingness
to push the limits of deference given to counsel's trial decisions
suggests that Wiggins will have profound effects on future ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases. First, after Wiggins, a court will
be able to compare counsel's performance against the deficient
performance by Wiggins's counsel. Furthermore, the federal courts
will review not only trial decisions made by counsel, but also the
thoroughness of investigations made by counsel to determine the
reasonableness of assistance. Finally, and most importantly, Wig-
gins ultimately will improve the quality of representation at the
trial level because appointed counsel, along with state trial judges,
are now on notice as to the level of investigation required under
the reasonableness standard. If counsel does not delve into the
background of the defendant, or if the court does not approve
funding for a social history report, counsel's subsequent trial
strategy becomes suspect and may be the basis for a valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because Wiggins is grounded in the law of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, Part II of this Note describes the development of
this law through three Supreme Court cases and legislation en-
acted in 1996 that limited a federal court's ability to review claims
for habeas relief. Part III of this Note analyzes Wiggins, emphasiz-
ing how the ambiguity in the state court's decision gave the Su-
preme Court an avenue to satisfy the federal habeas statute and
review the merits of Wiggins's claim. Part IV then reconciles the
differences in Bell v. Cone and Wiggins, while Part V describes the
impact of Wiggins on federal review of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims and on the performance of practitioners at the trial
level.
13. "It is still the law that if the lawyer has the evidence, evaluates it and
decides not to use it, that is close to unreviewable. .. ." Marcia Coyle, New
Standards in Death Cases, THE NAT'L L.J., July 14, 2003, at P1.
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II. EFFECTiVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL LAW
Until 1984, the Supreme Court said little about the right to
effective assistance of counsel. In that year, the Court decided
Strickland v. Washington, which established the constitutional
standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel .14 Then, in
1996, new legislation modified the process for requesting habeas
relief and narrowed the right of federal courts to review state
postconviction decisions. 15 After the passage of this legislation, the
Supreme Court analyzed the impact of the statutory limits on in-
effective assistance of counsel claims in Williams v. Taylor 16 and
Bell v. Cone.17 Of course, this precedent for Wiggins v. Smith de-
pends entirely on a constitutional guarantee of assistance of coun-
sel.
A. The United States Constitution
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution states that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."18 The Supreme Court interpreted this
clause, in Powell v. Alabama19 and Gideon v. Florida,20 to mean
that the government must appoint counsel to represent indigent
defendants. These cases, however, did not establish any standard
for counsel's performance. In the absence of any such standard,
appointed counsel, the trial judge and the defendant were unable
to adequately gauge the level of the constitutionally required as-
sistance of counsel.
B. Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland v. Washington the United States Supreme
Court established the standard for determining whether counsel's
performance deprived a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right
14. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1994).
15. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2003)).
16. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
17. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. 287 U.S. 45, 47 (1932).
20. 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
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to assistance of counsel. 21 In that case, the defendant, Washing-
ton, pled guilty to three murders against the advice of his ap-
pointed counsel. 22 Standing before the judge during the plea
colloquy, Washington freely accepted responsibility for his actions;
the judge then praised him for accepting responsibility. 23 As a re-
sult of this conversation, defense counsel decided not to seek out
character witnesses and chose not to order a psychiatric examina-
tion for the sentencing hearing. 24 Counsel believed that Washing-
ton's plea colloquy contained sufficient information about
Washington's background to convince the judge that the death
penalty was not appropriate. 25
At the sentencing hearing, counsel relied on Washington's
remorse and willingness to accept responsibility for the murders.
He also advocated against the death penalty for the following rea-
sons: Washington had no previous criminal history, he committed
the murders while under "extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance," and he surrendered and confessed to the police on his own
volition. 26 However, "the trial judge found numerous aggravating
circumstances and no ... mitigating circumstances."27 To exacer-
bate Washington's position, all aggravating circumstances found
by the judge related to the specific details of Washington's
crimes. 28 Hence, the judge concluded that the aggravating circum-
stances clearly outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sen-
tenced Washington to death on each of the three murder
charges.29
In postconviction proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court and
21. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1994).
22. Id. at 672.
23. Id. However, the judge gave no indication of how he would use Wash-
ington's acceptance of responsibility in determining the sentence for the mur-
ders. Id.
24. Counsel spoke on the telephone once with Washington's mother and
wife, and chose not to use them as character witnesses even though he never
met with them. Id. at 673.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 673-74.
27. Id. at 675.
28. The three murders were "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel ....
committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and violent fel-
ony .... for pecuniary gain, [and] committed to avoid arrest for the accompa-
nying crimes... ." Id. at 674.
29. Id. at 675.
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida denied relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. 30 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit overruled the decision, "developed its own framework for
analyzing ineffective assistance claims[,] ... and remanded the
case for new fact finding under the newly announced standards."31
In granting the government's petition for a writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court addressed for the first time "a claim of 'actual
ineffectiveness' of counsel's assistance in a case going to trial."32
The Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's "cause and prejudice" model
in its two-pronged analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This re-
quires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.33
In its opinion, the Court also provided extensive guidance on
how to analyze the two prongs of the test. Regarding the first
prong, the Court stated: "[Tihe proper standard for attorney per-
formance is that of reasonably effective assistance."34 The Court
explained that
30. Id. at 675, 678-79.
31. Id. at 679. The Fifth Circuit standard, which used a "cause and
prejudice" standard similar to the test eventually adopted by the Supreme
Court, included valuable insight into counsel's conduct during the investiga-
tion stages of the case. Id. at 682. The Fifth Circuit stated: "If there is more
than one plausible line of defense.., counsel should ideally investigate each
line substantially before making a strategic choice about which lines to rely
on at trial." Id. at 681.
32. Id. at 683. The Court previously addressed, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335 (1980), a claim that counsel's assistance was "rendered ineffective by
a conflict of interest," but never a claim that counsel's assistance was ren-
dered ineffective by the decisions made before or during trial. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 683.
33. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
34. Id.
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[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that coun-
sel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance... [and] the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action "might be considered sound trial
strategy."
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of
law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less
than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to
the extent that reasonable professional judgments sup-
port the limitations on investigation.35
To establish a showing of prejudice under the second prong,
the Court stated that "[tihe defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."36
After spending considerable verbiage developing its test, the
Court applied the test to the facts of the case and concluded that
counsel's performance was reasonable in two brief paragraphs.37
Of crucial importance to the decision was the Court's deferral to
counsel's strategic decision not to bring in additional information
that could have been damaging to the defendant's case. 38 Fur-
thermore, the Court evaluated counsel's performance in light of
the "utterly overwhelming" aggravating circumstances of the de-
fendant's crimes. 39 The Court held that "even without the applica-
tion of the presumption of adequate performance,"40 counsel
provided reasonably effective assistance.41 Thus, in its first appli-
35. Id. at 689-91 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955)).
36. Id. at 694.
37. Id. at 699.
38. Id. at 700.
39. Id. at 699.
40. Id.
41. Although it was not essential to the holding since the first prong of
the test was not met, the Court held, based on the comparative weight of the
aggravating evidence and the withheld mitigating evidence, that Washington
was not prejudiced by counsel's decision. Id. at 700.
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cation of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
denied relief to the defendant.42 This trend would continue for
more than fifteen years.43
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)
When Strickland was decided, United States Supreme Court
case law established that "a federal habeas court owed no defer-
ence to a state court's resolution of. .. questions of law or mixed
questions."44 Hence, in Strickland, the Court was able to evaluate
the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel inde-
pendently, without regard to the conclusions of the state court.
However, Congress superceded this standard by enacting the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).45
The federal habeas statute, as amended by the AEDPA, se-
verely curtailed a federal court's right to review state court deter-
minations of both law and fact. Under the amended statute, a
federal court cannot perform a plenary review of the state court's
conclusion of law unless the conclusion: (1) was "contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law,"46 or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. . .. "47
In addition, a federal court cannot reject a state court's finding of
fact unless the petitioner rebuts the finding by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence. "48
The impact of the amended statute was devastating for the
state prisoner. A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must
42. It is noteworthy that the test for determining whether the defendant
received effective assistance of counsel is named for the government party of
the principal case. Mr. Strickland was the Superintendent of the Florida
State Prison.
43. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
44. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 400 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
45. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (1996) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (2003)).
46. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2003).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
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convince the federal court to resolve two issues in favor of the
prisoner: first, that the state court decision was based on either an
unreasonable conclusion of law or finding of fact; and second, that
the correct law or fact supports a favorable decision. In accordance
with the statute's deference to the state, if the prisoner cannot
succeed on the first issue, the merits of the case cannot be heard.
More importantly, by establishing this two-issue hurdle for relief,
Congress created the need for case law to interpret the burdens
established in the statute.
D. Williams v. Taylor
In November of 1985, a man was found dead in his home in
Virginia; the cause of death was determined to be blood alcohol
.poisoning.49 While in the city prison for an unrelated offense,
Terry Williams drafted a statement confessing to the murder six
months after the deceased was found.50 Counsel was appointed to
Williams's case, but during the investigation before trial counsel
failed to request Williams's juvenile and social services records. 51
Counsel mistakenly believed that the records were inaccessible
according to state law.52 Had counsel obtained these records, he
would have learned of the abuse and numerous head injuries that
Williams suffered as a child, and that Williams was "borderline
mentally retarded."5 3 After convicting Williams of murder and
robbery, the jury sentenced him to death without hearing about
his sympathetic background.5 4
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Williams's sentence
and, in state postconviction-relief hearings, the court relied upon a
test other than Strickland to conclude that Williams was not
prejudiced by counsel's failure to perform a reasonable investiga-
tion.55 In addition, the state court failed to review the totality of
the available mitigating evidence when it rejected the trial judge's
49. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 373.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 370.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 372. Conversely, in postconviction proceedings the trial courtjudge found that Williams was prejudiced by counsel's performance solely
upon a Strickland analysis. Id. at 371.
20051 589
590 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.10:581
conclusion that Williams was prejudiced by counsel's deficient per-
formance. 56
Williams then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, and, after review by the district court and court of appeals,
the Supreme Court granted Williams's petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 57 Because Williams filed the petition after the enactment of
the AEDPA, the federal habeas statute as modified by the AEDPA
governed in Williams v. Taylor.58 In a sharply divided opinion, the
Supreme Court determined that the state supreme court applied a
standard that was both "contrary to"59 and "an unreasonable ap-
plication of"60 existing federal law when it denied postconviction
relief.6' Justice Stevens, writing for five members of the court,
provided the opinion that applied Strickland to Williams's case.
Justice O'Connor, however, drafted the majority opinion for the
Court's interpretation of the AEDPA amendments to the federal
habeas statute.
In Justice O'Connor's opinion on the AEDPA amendments,
the Court held that the "contrary to" clause of § 2254(d)(1) applies
when the "state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing
law set forth [in Supreme Court case law]."62 The Court also held
that the "unreasonable application" clause applies when "the state
court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Su-
preme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the
particular state prisoner's case."63 To further clarify the definition
of "unreasonable application," Justice O'Connor explained that a
federal court "should ask whether the state court's application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable."64
56. Id. at 397.
57. Id. at 374.
58. Id. at 402. Thus, Williams's claim was distinguished from the previ-
ous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that came before the U.S. Su-
preme Court, which did not require the Court to jump the AEDPA hurdle
before addressing the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
59. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2003).
60. Id.
61. Williams, 529 U.S. at 397.
62. Id. at 405.
63. Id. at 407.
64. Id. at 409 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the standard of "all
reasonable jurists" because it would result in a court's analysis of how other
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In the review of Williams's claim, the Court first held that the
state supreme court applied an incorrect test in evaluating
whether Williams was denied the effective assistance of counsel.65
Additionally, the state court did not look at the totality of the
available mitigating evidence when determining whether Wil-
liams was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, which was an
unreasonable application of federal law.66 Thus, Williams satisfied
his burden for federal review under § 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPA.
Relying on counsel's failure to sufficiently investigate Wil-
liams's background and his failure to introduce the evidence that
counsel did possess, the Court held that counsel's decisions were
not based on sound tactics and that counsel's performance was de-
ficient.67 Furthermore, the Court deferred to the judgment of the
state trial judge, who applied the correct legal test and found that
Williams was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. 68
Hence, both prongs of the test were satisfied and, for the first time
since Strickland was decided, the Court remanded a case on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel with an order for a new
sentencing hearing.69
Even though the AEDPA created additional burdens for prov-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel before a federal court, Wil-
liams v. Taylor illustrated that the incorrect selection of the legal
standard by a state court would subject the claim to review with-
out deference. Williams also demonstrated that an incorrect appli-
cation of the correct legal standard was objectively unreasonable
and would subject the claim to plenary review. The Supreme
Court addressed a slightly different question in the 2002 case, Bell
v. Cone.70
jurists have decided an issue. Id. at 409-10.
65. Id. at 395. The Virginia Supreme Court incorrectly applied the
Strickland test as modified by Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993),
which shifts the focus, even after satisfying the two prongs of Strickland, to
the "fundamental fairness" of the trial. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92.
66. Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98.
67. See id. at 396. "[Tlhe failure to introduce the comparatively volumi-
nous amount of evidence that did speak in Williams' favor was not justified
by a tactical decision to focus on Williams' voluntary confession." Id.
68. Id. at 398-99.
69. See id.
70. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
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E. Bell v. Cone
In the Supreme Court's next foray into ineffective assistance
of counsel, it retreated from its position in Williams by denying
postconviction relief where defense counsel chose to waive final
argument to the jury during the sentencing phase of a capital sen-
tencing case.71 In Bell v. Cone, the defendant, Cone, killed an eld-
erly couple with a blunt instrument.7 2 At trial, Cone was convicted
of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.7 3 He appealed to
the Tennessee Supreme Court which affirmed his conviction, and
the United States Supreme Court denied Cone's petition for cer-
tiorari.74
Cone then pursued postconviction relief. In the state court,
Cone's petition was based on a claim that his appointed counsel
provided ineffective assistance by "failing to present mitigating
evidence and by waiving final argument."75 The state court re-
jected his claim, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals af-
firmed the lower court's denial.7 6 In its opinion, the Court of
Criminal Appeals based its decision upon the Strickland standard
and expressly held that counsel's "performance was within the
permissible range of competency."77 The Tennessee Supreme
Court denied permission to appeal.78
Cone then filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus,
but the United States District Court for the District of Tennessee
held that the AEDPA barred relief and denied the petition.7 9 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
71. Id. at 688-89. One attorney stated that in Cone the Supreme Court
.reversed a lot of the progress they made in Williams." Jim Oliphant, Second-
Guessing Death Penalty Lawyers: High Court Weighs in on Ineffective-
Assistance Issues, TEXAS LAWYER, July 8, 2003.
72. Bell, 535 U.S. at 689. The killing occurred during Cone's evasion from
the police after he robbed a jewelry store, shot two people including a police
officer, and attempted to shoot one other individual. Id. His attempt to shoot
the individual was foiled because he ran out of ammunition. Id. Cone subse-
quently escaped from Tennessee to Florida, but he was captured after rob-
bing a drug store and returned to Tennessee for trial. Id. at 689-90.
73. See id. at 690-92.
74. Id. at 692.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 693.
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granted the petition and held in Cone's favor on the basis of an in-
correct test.80 However, because the state court had identified the
correct rule, the federal court was barred from disturbing the state
court's conclusion of law unless that conclusion represented an
"unreasonable application" of Strickland.81
After hearing the case, the Supreme Court determined that
the state court's holding, which denied relief to Cone based on
Strickland, was not objectively unreasonable.8 2 Specifically, the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals pointed to evidence on the
record, provided by Cone's counsel in the state postconviction
hearing, as to why counsel made specific decisions in the sentenc-
ing hearing.8 3 Counsel explained that his decision not to call fam-
ily members and friends of the defendant as witnesses in the
sentencing phase was based on a fear of the prosecutor's ability to
elicit damaging information about the defendant's past criminal
history from those witnesses.8 4 Cone's mother was not called to
testify because counsel felt that she made a poor witness in the
guilt phase of the trial.8 5 Finally, counsel explained that he chose
80. Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 979 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 534 U.S.
1064 (2001). The Sixth Circuit applied the test from United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648 (1984), which was decided on the same day as Strickland. Cone,
243 F.3d at 979. In Cronic, the Supreme Court held that prejudice is pre-
sumed when "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutor's case to mean-
ingful adversarial testing...." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Interpreting
counsel's waiver of final argument as a failure to subject the case to adversar-
ial testing, the Sixth Circuit presumed prejudice under Cronic for the second
prong of the- Strickland test. Cone, 243 F.3d at 979. However, the Cone major-
ity explained that for Cronic to apply rather than Strickland, the "attorney's
failure must be complete." Bell, 535 U.S. at 696-97. Cone's attorney, said the
majority, only failed to oppose the prosecution at certain points of the trial.
Id. The failure did not extend to the full duration of the trial; hence, Cronic
did not apply to Cone's claim. Id. Thus, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit
applied a rule of law "contrary to" the correct rule, which was the Strickland
test. See id. at 698. Conversely, the dissent wrote that counsel's failure to
subject the case to meaningful adversarial testing included failure to "per-
form[] a mitigation investigation, [present] available mitigation evidence, and
mak[e] a plea for the defendant's life after the State has asked for death .... "
Bell, 535 U.S. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent believed that
the failure was complete and agreed that Cronic was the proper standard.
See id. at 719.
81. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2003).
82. Bell, 535 U.S. at 699.
83. Cone v. Bell, 747 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
84. Id. at 357.
85. Id. at 356-57.
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to waive final argument because he feared the damaging impact of
the prosecution's rebuttal to which he could not respond.8 6 More-
over, counsel explained that he had made his opening argument
just a few hours before he was to make his closing argument;
hence, the jury did not need to hear a second plea for the defen-
dant's life.8 7
In summary, the state court upheld counsel's decisions as
trial strategy.88 Thus, in accordance with Strickland's presump-
tion that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance,"89 the state court concluded that
counsel's decisions were reasonable and held that the first prong
of the Strickland test was not satisfied.90 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that this conclusion was not "objectively unreasonable" and
denied Cone's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 91
At the end of the Supreme Court's 2002 term, ineffective as-
sistance of counsel law was vastly different than it was at the end
of the 1984 term. While the Strickland test remained unaltered,
the amendments to the federal habeas statute created numerous
barriers to federal review of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims from state court proceedings. Williams v. Taylor demon-
strated that federal review could be obtained only if the state
court conclusion was reached via application of the incorrect legal
test, or an objectively unreasonable application of the correct legal
test.92 However, Bell v. Cone illustrated that the deference given
to state court conclusions, viewed in light of Strickland's presump-
tion of reasonable professional conduct by counsel, made the state
court holdings practically unchallengeable on the merits. There-
fore, it appeared that even facially outrageous decisions by counsel
could not be successfully challenged after Cone unless counsel
provided arbitrary or capricious reasons for decisions made during
trial.93 This was the landscape of ineffective assistance of counsel
case law at the end of the 2002 United States Supreme Court
Term.
86. Id. at 357.
87. Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 978 (6th Cir. 2001).
88. Cone, 747 S.W.2d at 357.
89. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
90. Cone, 747 S.W.2d at 357.
91. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002).
92. Supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
93. Such as a decision to waive final argument.
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III. WIGGINS V. SMITH94
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In September, 1988, Kevin Wiggins worked as a painter at an
apartment building in Woodlawn, Maryland. 95 On the evening of
Thursday, September 15, between 5:00 p.m. and 5:50 p.m., Wig-
gins was seen speaking with an elderly female resident of the
apartment complex. 96 This was the last time the woman was seen
alive.97 On the morning of Saturday, September 17, when the
woman failed to attend a scheduled social gathering, friends con-
tacted the police. 98 The police investigated the woman's disap-
pearance and contacted the apartment complex manager.9 When
the apartment manager entered the woman's apartment, he found
the woman dead in her bathtub.100 The police, while examining
the victim's apartment, discovered a baseball cap and five finger-
prints.101 The owner of the baseball cap and the source of the fin-
gerprints were never established, but the fingerprints did not
match Kevin Wiggins's prints. 0 2
At approximately 7:45 p.m., on the evening of Thursday, Sep-
tember 15, Wiggins arrived at his girlfriend's house in the victim's
car. 03 The two went shopping that evening, and Wiggins made
purchases with the victim's credit cards. 0 4 On Saturday, Septem-
ber 17, Wiggins sold a ring that belonged to the victim in a local
pawnshop. 0 5 Then, on Wednesday, September 21, Wiggins and his
girlfriend were arrested while driving the victim's car. 06 Wiggins
told the police that he found the car, the credit cards, and the ring
94. 597 A.2d 1359 (Md. 1991) [hereinafter Wiggins I].
95. Id. at 1363.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1362.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1363. The evidence of Wiggins's actions on the evening of Sep-
tember 15 came from Wiggins's girlfriend who admitted to signing for the
purchases made with the victim's credit cards. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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on Friday, September 16, but his girlfriend refuted this story by
disclosing that Wiggins possessed the three items on Thursday
evening. 0 7
Wiggins was charged with first-degree murder, which in-
cluded a maximum penalty of death. 0 8 At trial, the prosecution
introduced evidence of conversations between Wiggins and other
inmates - one conversation during pretrial incarceration and one
while in the county detention center; the two inmates testified
that Wiggins revealed details of the crime and confessed to the
murder.10 9 Wiggins was convicted in a bench trial and requested a
jury for the penalty phase. 110 Maryland law required the jury to
determine "unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that
[Wiggins] was the actual killer" before sentencing Wiggins to
death."' In addition, the jury had to find that the "aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances . "..."112
Because Wiggins's conviction was decided entirely on circum-
stantial evidence, appointed counsel, Carl Schlaich and Michelle
Nethercott, moved to bifurcate the sentencing phase of the trial.113
With a bifurcated sentencing phase, counsel would first argue that
Wiggins was not a principal actor in the murder.114 Then, if the
jury found that Wiggins was a principal, counsel would present
the mitigating evidence to try to convince at least one juror that
the sum of the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating
evidence. 115 Counsel pursued the bifurcation in an attempt to
avoid a "'shotgun approach,' attacking everything and hoping that
something sticks."1 6 After moving for a bifurcated sentencing
hearing, counsel neither conducted a thorough investigation into
107. Id. at 1363-64.
108. Wiggins v. State II, 724 A.2d 1, 5 (Md. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
832 (1999) [hereinafter Wiggins II].
109. Wiggins I, 597 A.2d at 1364.
110. Wiggins II, 724 A.2d at 5. The judge stated that in finding Wiggins
guilty of murder, he did not rely on the testimony of the two inmates who tes-
tified that Wiggins confessed. Wiggins I, 597 A.2d at 1365. This statement
may have provided some insulation from reversal since Wiggins could have
challenged the weight of the testimony from the inmates.
111. See Wiggins II, 724 A.2d at 15.
112. See Wiggins I, 597 A.2d at 1366.
113. See Wiggins v. Smith 539 U.S. 510, 515 (2003).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Wiggins H, 724 A.2d at 15.
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Wiggins's background nor ordered a social history report, even
through the prevailing professional standards in Maryland in-
cluded generating a social history report.117 Additionally, the pub-
lic defender's office had funds available to hire a forensic social
worker.118 Thus, counsel knew only what was contained in two
minimal reports of Wiggins's background: the written presentence
investigation report (PSI) and a Department of Social Services
(DSS) report. 119 The judge denied the motion to bifurcate the sen-
tencing phase and the sentencing proceedings began on the follow-
ing day.120
During the sentencing phase, Counsel introduced only a sin-
gle mitigating fact: Wiggins had never before been convicted of a
violent criminal offense.' 2' Counsel failed to introduce evidence
from the DSS records that "Wiggins possessed 'borderline intelli-
gence' and in fact may have been mentally retarded." 22 In addi-
tion, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins's troubled
background. The absence of mitigating evidence during the sen-
tencing phase was noteworthy since counsel began her opening
argument to the jury by stating: "You're going to hear that Kevin
Wiggins has had a difficult life." 23
Before giving the closing argument, counsel attempted to pre-
serve the denial of the bifurcated sentencing hearing for appeal by
making a proffer to the court. 24 The proffer, made outside of the
jury's hearing, contained the evidence that counsel would have in-
troduced had the bifurcation motion been granted.125 Here counsel
addressed Wiggins's limited mental capacities and his lack of a
117. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515.
118. Id. at 517
119. Id. at 523-24. The presentence investigation report (PSI) included a
single page that briefly described Wiggins's "personal history"; the Depart-
ment of Social Services (DSS) report recorded Wiggins's experience with the
state foster care system. Id. at 523.
120. Id. at 515.
121. See id. at 518.
122. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 559 n.15 (D. Md. 2001)
[hereinafter Corcoran I]. The court noted that the Supreme Court had previ-
ously held "that mental retardation was a mitigator to be considered in capi-
tal cases." Id. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
123. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515.
124. Id. at 515-16.
125. Id.
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criminal history or aggressive tendencies.126 However, counsel
made no mention of Wiggins's background or upbringing.127 For
the second time, counsel failed to disclose what she knew of Wig-
gins's background. At the close of the trial, the jury found that
Wiggins was a principal in the murder, and that the murder was
committed in the course of robbing the victim. 128 Finally, the jury
found that the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating
evidence, and sentenced Kevin Wiggins to death. 29
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed Wiggins's death
sentence and his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied. 30 He
then filed a petition for postconviction relief with the state. The
petition included a claim that counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance, but the state circuit court denied his petition, and the Court
of Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 131
Wiggins then filed a petition for postconviction relief in the
federal court system. 32 Unlike the state courts, the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland held that Wiggins did
not receive the effective assistance of counsel in the sentencing
phase of his trial.33 The district court compared Wiggins's claim to
that in Williams v. Taylor,34 noting that Wiggins's mitigating evi-
dence was much stronger, and that his aggravating evidence much
weaker.1' 5 Specifically, the district court cited the following infor-
mation regarding Wiggins's social history - contained in Wiggins's
postconviction report but excluded from the DSS report and PSI -
as the sum of mitigating evidence that counsel needed to make an
educated decision on selection of tactics for the sentencing hear-
126. Id. at 516.
127. Id.
128. Wiggins I, 597 A.2d 1359, 1365 (Md. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1007 (1992).
129. Id. at 1366.
130. Wiggins I, 597 A.2d at 1359. In Maryland, the highest state court is
named The Court of Appeals of Maryland.
131. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in denying Wiggins's petition for
post conviction relief, held that "counsel made a deliberate, tactical decision
to concentrate their effort at convincing the jury that appellant was not a
principal in the killing of [the victim]." Wiggins II, 724 A.2d 1, 15 (Md. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832 (1999).
132. Corcoran I, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2001).
133. Id. at 560.
134. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
135. Corcoran I, 164 F.Supp. 2d at 558 ("Therefore, it follows a fortiori
that Wiggins was prejudiced by his counsels' unprofessional errors.").
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ing:
As an infant, Wiggins and his siblings were routinely left
alone and unfed for days at a time....
As a toddler, Wiggins witnessed one of his sisters rou-
tinely being sexually abused by an adult male friend of
his mother.
At age 6, Wiggins was intentionally burned by his own
mother on a hot stove as punishment for playing with
matches.
Wiggins was physically abused by his first foster family
and, from the age of 8 on, was sexually abused for many
years by his second foster father.
Wiggins was raped by the teenaged sons of his fourth fos-
ter family.
At age 16, Wiggins was molested by his Job Corp Super-
visor.
13 6
Because the record contained no evidence that counsel knew
this information, the district court held that counsel could not
make an informed decision on a strategy for the sentencing hear-
ing.137 Furthermore, the district court held that had the jury heard
this mitigating evidence, it might have imposed a different sen-
tence.138
Wiggins's victory, however, was short-lived. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court holding.139 The court of appeals noted that "[Wiggins's]
sentencing counsel, Mr. Schlaich, did know about [Wiggins's] diffi-
cult childhood... [which was] sufficient to make an informed
strategy choice." 140 Because the Fourth Circuit found this deter-
mination to be reasonable, the AEDPA prohibited federal court
136. Id. at 559 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 560.
138. Id.
139. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Corcoran Ill.
140. Id. at 641.
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review of the merits of Wiggins's claim.14' The United States Su-
preme Court granted Wiggins's petition for a writ of certiorari
with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
sentencing phase of the trial.142
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, drafted by Justice O'Connor, 143 began
its analysis by explaining that the state court denied relief using
the correct legal standard; thus, AEDPA permitted a very narrow
review by the federal courts.'" Then, focusing on an ambiguous
conclusion in the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the Court expanded its
review to the merits of Wiggins's claim and conducted a plenary
review of the scope of counsel's investigation. 45 Finally, based on
the Court's determination of the scope of the investigation, the
Court found that Wiggins was prejudiced by counsel's deficient
performance and remanded the case for a new sentencing hear-
ing.146
After a discussion of the facts and procedural posture of the
case, the Court applied the AEDPA to Wiggins's claim. Justice
O'Connor first focused on § 2254(d)(1) and stated that "the 'unrea-
sonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas
court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct gov-
erning legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts' of the case."147 As explained in
Williams, the Court must defer to a state court's conclusion unless
the conclusion is "objectively unreasonable."' 4s
Unlike in Williams, the state court in Wiggins denied post-
141. Id.
142. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
only on the question of ineffective assistance of counsel in the sentencing
phase. The Court denied the petition for the question of whether the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the murder conviction. Wiggins v. Smith, 537 U.S.
1027 (2002) (granting the petition for a writ of certiorari in part).
143. Justice O'Connor also drafted the majority opinion in Strickland, and
drafted the majority opinion regarding how AEDPA should be applied in Wil-
liams v. Taylor. These are the two key opinions on which Wiggins v. Smith
relies.
144. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518-20.
145. Id. at 523.
146. Id. at 538.
147. Id. at 520 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)).
148. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
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conviction relief based on the correct legal standard: the Strick-
land test.149 Furthermore, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied
relief to Wiggins because his counsel's decision to withhold mitiga-
tion evidence in the sentencing phase was a matter of trial tac-
tics. 150 Hence, under § 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPA, the Supreme
Court had to find this application of Strickland to be objectively
unreasonable. As a means of gauging the reasonableness of the
state court decision, the Court conducted its own evaluation of
Wiggins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Under Strickland, "[a] petitioner must show that counsel's
performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the
defense."'5 ' Wiggins's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
stemmed from counsel's decision not to develop a mitigation ar-
gument for the sentencing hearing. 5 2 Hence, Justice O'Connor
looked to the guiding language of Strickland: "In any ineffective-
ness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments."' 53 Keying in
on this language, the Court focused not on the reasonableness of
counsel's decision to withhold mitigating evidence from the sen-
tencing phase of the trial, but rather on the reasonableness of
counsel's decision to limit the investigation into Wiggins's back-
ground.54 More importantly, this analysis required the Court to
consider what counsel knew about the defendant, Kevin Wiggins,
when the decision was made to cease further investigation.
Without determining whether the state court unreasonably
applied Strickland, the Court performed its own Strickland analy-
sis. Among the first issues discussed was the crucial determina-
tion by the state court of the scope of counsel's investigation. 55
The Court noted that "both the Fourth Circuit and the Maryland
149. Wiggins II, 724 A.2d 1, 12, 17 (Md.. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832
(1999).
150. Id. at 17-18.
151. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984)).
152. Id.
153. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
154. "[W]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's deci-
sion not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was itself
reasonable." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523.
155. Id. at 521-22.
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Court of Appeals referred only to" the written PSI and the DSS
report when describing the limits of counsel's investigation into
Wiggins's background. 156 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that
counsel went no further than these two reports in investigating
Wiggins's background prior to trial, and held that this decision
"fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Mary-
land in 1989." 157 Counsel's failure to comport to the state profes-
sional standards and the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases essentially
established a per se violation of the first prong of Strickland.58
Furthermore, the Court found a violation of the first prong of
Strickland in counsel's failure to investigate further into Wiggins's
background based on what counsel actually knew. 15 9 The DSS re-
port contained numerous indicators of Wiggins's troubled child-
hood that might have led counsel to additional mitigating factors
for use at trial, but counsel chose to look no further. 160 Here, the
Court distinguished previous Supreme Court cases, such as Bur-
ger v. Kemp, 161 where counsel conducted a limited investigation for
a valid reason. 162 Thus, the Court did not disturb valid Strickland
precedent. After Wiggins v. Smith counsel can still terminate an
156. Id. at 523-24.
157. Id. at 524. This limitation of investigation satisfied the first prong of
unreasonable practice by defense counsel. Here, the Court compared counsel's
performance with the standard practice in the state at the time of the trial,
and also compared counsel's performance against the American Bar Associa-
tion standards. Id.
158. Id. While the Court did not expressly call this a per se violation, there
is no citation to testimony of competent counsel to support that these stan-
dards are the standards of reasonable counsel. The evidence that the Court
used to support its conclusion is the admission, by one of Wiggins's trial
counsel, that the "standard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time
of Wiggins' trial included the preparation of a social history report." Id.
159. Id. at 525.
160. Id. The DSS report contained the following facts of Wiggins's life his-
tory: his natural mother was a practicing alcoholic; he lived in numerous fos-
ter homes throughout his childhood; he was frequently absent from school;
and at least once "his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without
food." Id.
161. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). The court held that counsel's decision to limit
the search for mitigating evidence was reasonable where the evidence "Would
not have minimized the risk of the death penalty." Id. at 795.
162. Id. In Burger v. Kemp counsel interviewed all witnesses brought to
his attention and stopped the investigation when those interviews yielded lit-
tle helpful information. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525.
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investigation if the mitigation case may turn out to be "counter-
productive," or if "further investigation would [be] fruitless."163
Finally, the Court evaluated the whole of the record to rebut
the state court's holding that counsel's decision not to present
mitigating evidence at the trial was a tactical choice. Counsel
moved to bifurcate the sentencing phase of the trial, but the mo-
tion was not decided until the day before sentencing.16 Thus,
counsel had every reason to conduct a thorough investigation into
the mitigating evidence in Wiggins's background. 165 Justice
O'Connor warned lower courts against "post-hoc rationalization of
counsel's conduct" when determining whether counsel's decision
was strategic. 166
Based on the determination that counsel's investigation went
no further than the PSI or DSS report, the Court returned to the
AEDPA burden and held that the state court's "application of
Strickland's governing legal principles was objectively unreason-
able." 167 First, the Court stated that "the Court of Appeals' as-
sumption that the investigation was adequate.., reflected an
unreasonable application of Strickland."16s Second, the Court held
that "the court's subsequent deference to counsel's strategic deci-
sion not 'to present every conceivable mitigation defense,' despite
the fact that counsel based this alleged choice on what ... was an
unreasonable investigation, was also objectively unreasonable." 169
Based on its own analysis of Wiggins's claim, the Court held that
the first prong of Strickland was satisfied.'70
163. Id.
164. Id. at 515.
165. Id. at 526. The Court does not address what would have happened
had the motion to bifurcate been granted, but it serves to put Wiggins in per-
spective with the sum of ineffective assistance of counsel case law. Assuming
counsel had introduced all its mitigating evidence, the Court still could have
found a violation of the first prong of Strickland based either on the reason-
able standards in the community or on the sum of knowledge counsel pos-
sessed at the time of trial. Hence, the Court's determination of the issue in
the case becomes even more telling: even strong mitigating cases can be the
basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the investigation is
unreasonable. Of course, the defendant must still satisfy the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test to gain relief.
166. Id. at 527.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 528 (citation omitted).
170. Id. at 533-34.
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Before analyzing the results of counsel's deficient perform-
ance, however, the Court addressed a second avenue of review.
Under § 2254(d)(2), the Court could review a state court conclu-
sion of law if the state court decision "was based on an unreason-
able determination of the facts."171 The Maryland Court of Appeals
denied postconviction relief because counsel knew of Wiggins's
sexual abuse by reading the "social services records that recorded
incidences of physical and sexual abuse ... ,"172 However, on fed-
eral habeas review, the parties conceded that the social service re-
cords did not contain any evidence of sexual abuse. 173
Furthermore, the records contained none of the sordid details of
rape and molestation included in a report prepared by a social
worker for the state postconviction hearing.174 Therefore, the Su-
preme Court determined that counsel did not know of the sexual
abuse experienced by Wiggins, and found the state postconviction
denial of relief to be based on "clear factual error,"175 error "shown
to be incorrect by 'clear and convincing evidence. '" 176
Justice Scalia, dissenting, criticized the majority opinion for
not adhering to the state court's factual determination that Wig-
gins's trial "'counsel did investigate and were aware of [Wiggins's]
background.' 177 The majority responded with a presumption that
silence is not a determination: "Had the [state] court found that
counsel's investigation extended beyond the PSI and the DSS re-
cords, the dissent, of course, would be correct that § 2254(e) would
require that we defer to that finding. But the state court made no
such finding."178 This comment is crucial to the Court's analysis
for many reasons. First, and most importantly, had the state court
expressly determined that the investigation extended beyond the
PSI and DSS report, then § 2254(e) would require Wiggins to
171. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2) (Supp. 2004).
172. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518 (citing to Wiggins II, 724 A.2d 1, 15 (Md.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832 (1999)).
173. Id. at 528.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. 2004)). § 2254(e)(1) of the
AEDPA requires that "determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In federal review,
this presumption can only be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." Id.
177. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528 (citing Wiggins II, 724 A.2d at 15-16).
178. Id. at 530.
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prove the contrary by "clear and convincing evidence."179 Further-
more, the Supreme Court would be bound by the state's factual
determinations, unless rebutted by Wiggins, in determining
whether either prong of § 2254(d) was satisfied. If the scope of in-
vestigation had not been subject to a plenary review by the Su-
preme Court, the focus of the Court would have shifted from the
question of whether the investigation was reasonable to the ques-
tion of whether the decision not to introduce mitigating evidence,
once known by counsel, was reasonable. As shown by the defer-
ence given to counsel under Strickland, the defense will not pre-
vail on that issue unless counsel's decision was entirely arbitrary.
Thus, the state court's failure to precisely determine the scope of
counsel's investigation serves as the lynchpin of this case. 180
Having satisfied the barrier to federal review from the
AEDPA and the first prong of the Strickland test, the Court then
looked to the prejudice that resulted from counsel's failure to in-
vestigate Wiggins's background: "In order for counsel's inadequate
performance to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, [Wiggins]
must show that counsel's failures prejudiced his defense."' 8'
Because counsel was not sufficiently aware of Wiggins's back-
ground to make an informed decision about whether to introduce
evidence of his background in mitigation, the Court made two de-
terminations to find that the prejudice prong was satisfied. First,
the Court determined that had counsel performed a reasonable
investigation and learned of Wiggins's background, counsel would
have introduced the mitigation evidence at the trial. 8 2 Second, the
Court determined that the introduction of this evidence might
have resulted in a different sentence. 8 3 In answering the first
question, the Court noted that Wiggins's background, which no-
ticeably contained no prior criminal history, lacked the "double
179. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. 2004).
180. In oral argument, counsel for Wiggins stressed this point: "[Wihat
AEDPA requires deference to is factual findings made by a State court." Oral
Argument for Wiggins at *16, Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003)
(No. 02-311), available at 2003 WL 1699820. However, the only factual find-
ing made by the state court regarding the scope of counsel's knowledge, was
that "counsel was indeed aware of [Wiggins's] unfortunate background." Id.
181. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)).
182. Id. at 535.
183. Id. at 536.
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edge" that infects potential mitigating evidence to make it coun-
terproductive. 184 The Court then looked to the "totality of the evi-
dence" from the trial and the habeas proceeding to determine that
there was a "reasonable probability that at least one juror would
have struck a different balance" had the jury heard the mitigating
evidence. 85 Thus, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit decision
and, for the second time in effective assistance of counsel case law,
remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.
C. The Dissent
Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas
in dissent, believed that the Court exceeded the limits established
by Congress in the AEDPA. The dissent's primary objection was
that the majority relied upon Williams v. Taylor in using the pre-
vailing standards of professional conduct to judge counsel's con-
duct.186 According to Strickland, the dissent argued, courts should
use the standards only as guides for determining the required
level of performance. 187 Williams later added the professional
standards to counsel's obligations under the Strickland analy-
sis.188 Since Williams was decided by the Supreme Court one year
after Maryland denied postconviction relief to Wiggins, it was not,
at that time, the existing federal law for purposes of the AEDPA.
Justice O'Connor countered the dissent's criticism by noting that
Williams, which was "squarely governed by [the Court's] holding
in Strickland,"18 9 created no new law. 190
184. Id. at 535. Had the material from the postconviction report been in-
troduced at the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury "would have heard that
[Wiggins] hated his biological mother, that he was in fights with other foster
children, that he had once stolen some gasoline and tried to set fire to [ a
building...." Oral Argument for Smith at *46, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003) (No. 02-311), available at 2003 WL 1699820. Be-
cause the Court did not address this evidence in its opinion, it likely felt that
this evidence could not have reasonably dissuaded counsel from introducing
the vast amount of truly mitigating evidence from the report.
185. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536, 537.
186. Id. at 542 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
188. Williams was the case in which the Court imposed on counsel the "ob-
ligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background."
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000).
189. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 395).
190. Thus, the majority established a distinction for the purpose of
AEDPA § 2254(d)(1) review: those cases that create new law and those cases
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The dissent put forth one additional argument under
§ 2254(d)(1), one argument under § 2254(d)(2), and an argument
against the majority's finding of prejudice as a result of counsel's
deficient performance. While persuasive, these arguments only
drew the support of two of the nine Justices. 191
IV. RECONCILING THE HOLDINGS IN WIGGINS AND CONE
The unique juxtaposition of Wiggins v. Smith and Bell v.
Cone, at first blush, produces more questions than answers. The
Court took a strong position against postconviction relief in its
eight-to-one decision in Cone, and then granted postconviction re-
lief to Wiggins in a seven-to-two decision in the next term. With-
out looking further into the specific holdings of each case, these
two decisions seem reconcilable by nothing more than the weight
of the evidence against each individual defendant. In Cone, the
Court noted that Cone committed "a horribly brutal and senseless
crime against two elderly persons in their home."192 Furthermore,
that simply apply the holdings of existing case law. Based on the language in
Wiggins, the decision, as in Williams, is an application of Strickland. Hence,
Wiggins is exempt from the requirement of "clearly established" precedent for
the purpose of federal review, and can be relied upon to reverse state court
postconviction denials even if those decisions were made before Wiggins was
decided.
191. The dissent's second objection under § 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPA was
that the majority violated the AEDPA by using the silence regarding coun-
sel's scope of investigation as an opportunity to determine how far counsel
investigated. The dissent averred that the Supreme Court could not conclude
that the state court conclusion was "unreasonable" based on a factual deter-
mination made by the Court in violation of AEDPA. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 543-
44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the majority's reli-
ance on § 2254(d)(2) because the state court determination of counsel's
knowledge was based primarily on counsel's testimony in the postconviction
hearing. Id. at 551-52. The dissent believed that the state court conclusion
was not unreasonable; thus, the Supreme Court should have deferred to the
state court factual finding. Id. at 552. Finally, the dissent also disagreed with
each step of the majority's reasoning that led to the finding of prejudice.
First, Justice Scalia doubted that counsel would have altered the chosen
strategy of trying to convince the jury that Wiggins "was not a principal in
the killing" of the victim, even if counsel had additional mitigating evidence.
Id. at 552, 553 (quoting Wiggins 11, 724 A.2d 1, 15 (Md. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 832 (1999)). Second, Justice Scalia looked to the nature of the miti-
gating evidence to conclude that it would not have been admissible as "reli-
able" evidence since it was nearly all provided by Wiggins himself. Id. at 554
(quoting Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 243 (Md. 1995)).
192. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002).
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"[t]he State had near conclusive proof of [Cone's] guilt ..... 193
Conversely, Wiggins's guilt was determined based on "almost en-
tirely circumstantial" evidence. 94 However, the weight of the evi-
dence supporting each defendant's guilty verdict does not tell the
entire story since the Supreme Court granted Wiggins's petition
for a writ of certiorari for only the sentencing phase of the trial. 95
Rather, the reconciliation of these two cases is grounded in the
completeness of the records in the state postconviction evidentiary
hearings, the thoroughness of each court's holding, and the nature
of the claims made in each case.
In Bell v. Cone, the prisoner's claim was based on counsel's
choice of trial tactics. During the state postconviction hearings,
counsel was able to articulate the reasoning behind his selected
tactics. Extending great deference to counsel's decisions, the trial
court judge found the tactics to be reasonable. Furthermore, the
state court of appeals affirmed on the ground that defense counsel
"made a diligent and thorough investigation of the facts and the
law."196 Thus, on federal habeas review, there were no disputes
about the thoroughness of counsel's performance, only questions of
counsel's judgment.
When the Supreme Court reviewed the state court conclusion,
the review was extremely limited. The Court did not evaluate
whether it believed that counsel was deficient under the Strick-
land test. Rather, the only question before the Court was whether
the state court conclusion of law was "objectively unreasonable." 197
Under Strickland, a court must extend great deference to coun-
sel's strategic trial decisions. 198 Thus, combining the Strickland
analysis and the AEDPA burden, the Supreme Court could not
have performed a plenary review of Cone's claim unless the state
193. Id.
194. Wiggins 1I, 724 A.2d 1, 5 (Md. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832
(1999). As reported, there was "no forensic evidence linking Wiggins to the
murder, though there was unidentified forensic evidence - fingerprints, hair,
fibers and a baseball cap left at the scene." Deborah Sontag, The Power of the
Fourth, N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE, Mar. 9, 2003, at 40.
195. The Supreme Court could have reversed Wiggins's conviction had it
granted the petition for the writ of certiorari on both issues raised by Wig-
gins. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
196. Cone v. State, 747 S.W.2d. 353, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
197. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003).
198. Id. at 521.
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court was objectively unreasonable in deferring to counsel's deci-
sions. Only if counsel provided a patently arbitrary reason for his
tactics would this test be satisfied. Because reasonable minds
might disagree on whether counsel's tactics were arbitrary, Cone
could not meet his burden. The Supreme Court did not reject the
state court's conclusion that counsel's tactics were legitimate, and
no independent review into the reasonableness of counsel's tactics
was permitted by the AEDPA.
Conversely, in Wiggins, the scope of review by the Supreme
Court was expanded not by the AEDPA, but by the incomplete-
ness of the state court's decision. Unlike Cone, Wiggins raised a
claim that required a factual determination of counsel's perform-
ance. The question was not whether counsel made a reasonable
decision, but whether counsel conducted sufficient investigation to
make a reasonable decision. Thus, to answer this question, the
state court had to determine what counsel knew before deciding
against a mitigation argument. The state court, in concluding that
counsel's performance was not deficient, made a general state-
ment that counsel "were aware of [Wiggins's] background."199
However, this general statement did not address the scope of
counsel's investigation. It is undisputed that counsel knew of the
contents of the DSS report and the PSI, but the state court did not
determine or question whether counsel looked beyond those docu-
ments. Counsel admitted during the postconviction hearing that
no social history report was prepared. Furthermore, based on the
limited mitigation evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing
and the incomplete proffer made before closing arguments, coun-
sel likely did not possess the pertinent information regarding
Wiggins's background. However, under AEDPA, the Supreme
Court was bound to the state court holding unless the holding re-
flected an unreasonable application of the law or was based upon
an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Ultimately, the state court's general conclusion about the
scope of counsel's investigation opened the door for the Supreme
Court to evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's performance un-
der Strickland. Contrary to the conclusion made by the state
court, the Supreme Court determined that counsel did not look
beyond the two perfunctory reports of Wiggins's background. This
199. Wiggins II, 724 A.2d at 16.
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level of investigation did not comport with effective assistance of
counsel under Strickland; hence, the state court conclusion was
unreasonable, and the AEDPA burden was satisfied. More impor-
tantly, the first prong of Strickland was satisfied. Thus, while the
holding in Cone is grounded in the scope of review as limited by
AEDPA, the holding in Wiggins is grounded in the Court's lan-
guage from Strickland.
Based on this conclusion, each case could have yielded differ-
ent results under both the AEDPA and Strickland. For example,
counsel for Cone waived final argument to prevent the prosecution
from delivering a rebuttal. At the state postconviction hearing
counsel justified his decision by explaining that the lead prosecu-
tor was capable of delivering "devastating closing arguments."200
In hindsight, Cone could have questioned trial counsel's personal
knowledge of the lead prosecutor's abilities during the state post-
conviction relief hearing. Had this factual question gone unan-
swered by the state court, the Supreme Court could have
performed a factual review and possibly concluded that classifying
the waiver as a trial tactic without sufficient knowledge was objec-
tively unreasonable. In this manner, Cone might have met the
AEDPA burden. Furthermore, an evaluation of Cone's claim under
the Strickland analysis may have resulted in a reversal of the sen-
tence since the decision to waive final argument, made without
adequate justification, arguably satisfies the harm and prejudice
prongs of the test.
Conversely, in Wiggins, a more specific conclusion of the scope
of counsel's investigation by the state court would have halted the
Supreme Court's review of Wiggins's claim before reaching the
merits. Had the state court made a factual determination that
counsel looked beyond the two reports when preparing for trial,
and if that determination was reasonable, the challenge on federal
postconviction review would have become a question not of fact,
but of counsel's trial tactics. In that situation, the Court would
have been limited to determining whether the state court's finding
of sufficient performance by counsel was objectively unreasonable.
A judge determined Wiggins's guilt; the jury entered the trial at
the sentencing phase and knew nothing of the evidence admitted
in the guilt phase. In this circumstance, with knowledge of Wig-
200. Cone, 747 S.W.2d at 357.
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gins's background, counsel probably would have made a reason-
able tactical decision to try to convince the jury that Wiggins was
not a principal actor in the murder. Thus, had the state court
made a reasonable factual finding that counsel looked beyond the
two reports and selected the tactic of retrying guilt, the Supreme
Court would have had no authority to reverse the state court deci-
sion.
Thus, while the difference between Wiggins and Cone seems
to extend no further than the quantity and quality of evidence
supporting the guilty verdicts and capital sentences, this under-
standing misses the nuances of the Court's decisions. The true dif-
ference lies in the type of review conducted by the Supreme Court
under the federal habeas statute and the Strickland analysis in
each case, and in the Court's authority to conduct such review
based upon the record from the postconviciton relief hearing.
V. IMPACTS OF WIGGINS V. SMITH
In support of the determination that Wiggins is merely an ap-
plication of Strickland, one need go no further than recent case
law in the federal appellate circuits to see that an analysis similar
to that used by Justice O'Connor is not unique. Where counsel has
conducted a limited investigation, and the investigation was rea-
sonable based on what counsel knew when the decision to (or not
to) investigate was made, relief will be denied.
As in Wiggins, failure to investigate is not a reasonable deci-
sion. For example, in Clark v. Redman,201 the defendant in a mur-
der trial claimed to be out of town on the day of the murder.
Rather than pursue and interview the defendant's alibi witnesses,
the appointed defense counsel chose, as his only defense, to cross-
examine the prosecution's witnesses.20 2 Furthermore, counsel
failed to interview the one potential witness who could rebut the
prosecution's key witness. 20 3 Counsel claimed that he chose not to
interview the potential witness because the man had been in
prison and would not be reliable. 204 The court held that counsel's
decision to forego interviewing potential witnesses "was unques-
201. No. 86-2050, 1988 WL 138971, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 1988).
202. Id.
203. Id. at *1-2.
204. Id. at *2.
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tionably an unreasonable decision, even after 'applying a heavy
measure of deference' to [counsel's] judgment ... "205
United States v. Kaufman2 6 is similarly illustrative. Even
though counsel had a letter from a psychiatrist which diagnosed
the defendant as "psychotic" at the time the defendant received
stolen property, counsel recommended that the defendant plead
guilty to federal charges without first performing any independent
investigation into a possible insanity defense. 207 The court stated
that "[o]nly if [counsel] had investigated [defendant's] long history
of serious mental illness, and conducted some legal research re-
garding the insanity defense could his counseling be characterized
as 'strategy."' 2 8 The court held counsel's performance to be unrea-
sonable. 20 9
Furthermore, as in Wiggins, counsel's decision to limit inves-
tigation will be held unreasonable if further investigation may
yield mitigating evidence. In Valdez v. Johnson,210 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas noted that
counsel did not conduct even a minimal investigation into the de-
fendant's background.211 If counsel had, they would have discov-
ered indicators "suggesting mental retardation."212 The district
court held, just as Justice O'Connor had in Wiggins, that "[wihen
counsel is on notice of a potential mitigating factor, counsel must
make a more thorough and independent investigation into the de-
fendant's background for substantiating evidence." 2' 3 Further-
more, "counsel's failure to thoroughly investigate and present
mitigating evidence [was not] born of some tactical fear of 'opening
the door' to evidence of prior bad conduct or criminal convic-
tions."214 Throughout the decision, the district court cited to lan-
guage in Strickland for support in evaluating the claim. 215
205. Id. at *3.
206. 109 F.3d 186 (1997).
207. Id. at 188.
208. Id. at 190.
209. Id. at 191.
210. 93 F. Supp. 2d 769 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 274 F.3d
941 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 883 (2002).
211. Id. at 782.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 1997)).
214. Id. at 785.
215. Id. at 778-87.
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However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
later vacated the district court's decision to grant relief to Val-
dez. 216 The district court violated the AEDPA by ordering an evi-
dentiary hearing even through the prisoner did not rebut the
state's findings of fact through "clear and convincing evidence."
217
Thus, under the AEDPA, the federal court could only grant relief
based on the facts as determined in the state postconviction hear-
ing.
The ultimate issue in both Wiggins and Valdez was a question
of fact: What was the scope of counsel's investigation into the de-
fendant's background prior to trial? That question could be an-
swered by reviewing the record in Wiggins. In Valdez, that
question could only be answered with the evidence obtained in the
inappropriately ordered evidentiary hearing. Thus, these cases are
distinguished by the completeness of the record in the state ha-
beas proceedings. Although Valdez was overruled because the dis-
trict court had violated the AEDPA, the similarity in the
reasoning used to decide both Valdez and Wiggins supports the
conclusion that Wiggins was also grounded in the language from
Strickland.
Also consistent with the guidance from Strickland, courts
have held that counsel is not expected to exhaust every lead in an
investigation. 218 In Rogers v. Zant21 9 counsel chose not to bring out
that the defendant was high on PCP when the he killed his
neighbor.220 Even without investigating the effects of the hallu-
cinogenic drug, counsel's knowledge of the negative impact intro-
ducing the defendant's intoxication during the commission of the
crime would have supported the reasonableness of the decision not
to investigate. 22' The court held the decision to be reasonable, and
216. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
217. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. 2004).
218. Interestingly, the state court that denied Cone's petition for postcon-
viction relief and concluded that counsel's decision to waive final argument
was reasonable stated that "[n]o stone was left unturned in the preparation of
appellant's defense." Cone v. State, 747 S.W.2d. 353, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1987).
219. 13 F.3d 384 (11th Cir. 1994).
220. Id. at 385.
221. Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding counsel's de-
cision, the court reasoned:
Defense counsel knew, at least, four important things when they in-
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stated that "'strategy' can include a decision not to investigate. 222
Strickland indicates clearly that the ineffectiveness question
turns on whether the decision not to make a particular investiga-
tion was reasonable." 223
A review of case law decided after Wiggins demonstrates little
change in ineffective assistance analysis. In Anderson v. John-
son224 the Fifth Circuit cited Wiggins, decided just a few days be-
fore, to justify the conclusion that "a witness's character flaws
cannot support a failure to investigate."225 As Justice O'Connor
implied in Wiggins, deciding not to call a witness to testify due to
a perceived lack of credibility is a trial tactic; deciding not to inter-
view a witness for the same reason is no strategy at all. Such a
course of action leaves counsel without sufficient information to
justify the decision not to call the witness. However, Wiggins was
not required for the court to reach its opinion, nor was Wiggins
even the primary source to which the court cited. Rather, the court
cited Bryant v. Scott,226 a 1994 case from the Fifth Circuit, which
relied upon Strickland for its holding.227
In another recent case, Byram v. Ozmint,228 the court distin-
guished Wiggins by citing to the vast amount of time counsel
spent in preparation for Byram's trial.229 In addition, the court
vestigated no further about PCP: (1) they knew that there was some
evidence of PCP use; (2) they knew that PCP was a hallucinogen; (3)
they knew that a [local] jury would likely react hostilely to an asser-
tion that a person should in some way be excused from the conse-
quences of his acts because he had voluntarily taken drugs; and (4)
they knew there were other possible defenses and mitigating factors
that might be advanced.
[Furthermore, ciounsel could have reasonably believed that develop-
ing Rogers' drug use as a defense would have.., been perceived by
the jury as aggravating instead of mitigating.
Id. at 387-88.
222. Id. at 387.
223. Id.
224. 338 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2003).
225. Id. at 392.
226. 28 F.3d 1411 (5th Cir. 1994).
227. See generally id.
228. 339 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2003). Notably, Wiggins came to the Supreme
Court through the Fourth Circuit, which denied relief to Wiggins.
229. In addition to making over thirty visits with the defendant, counsel
ordered examinations by a forensic psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist,
searched the defendant's school records, and interviewed the defendant's
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recognized that the reasonableness and extent of counsel's inves-
tigation must be viewed "in light of the scarcity of counsel's time
and resources in preparing for a sentencing hearing and the real-
ity that counsel must concentrate his efforts on the strongest ar-
guments in favor of mitigation."230 Most importantly, the court
distinguished the holding in Wiggins by noting that Byram's coun-
sel presented a strong mitigation argument before the jury, and
that the mitigation evidence not introduced was "largely cumula-
tive."231
In both Anderson v. Johnson and Byram v. Ozmint the respec-
tive courts relied upon the language from Strickland to evaluate
the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The addition of
Wiggins v. Smith to this landscape did not modify the underlying
analysis.
A. The Impact On Federal Postconviction Review
While Wiggins added little to the holdings of the preceding
cases, it cannot be said that Wiggins has no value to courts during
review of claims of ineffective assistance. Of the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims heard by the Supreme Court, Wiggins sits
with Williams v. Taylor as the only two cases in which relief was
granted. 232 Thus, Wiggins provides a lower boundary in the range
of acceptable performance by counsel against which future claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel must be measured.
In addition, the conclusion that Wiggins does not change the
way the federal courts review claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel is not without value to defendants who wish to raise fed-
eral habeas claims. Because Wiggins is grounded solidly in the
reasoning of Strickland, it is not new law. Hence, just as the ma-
jority opinion in Wiggins was able to rely upon Williams because
the Williams decision was grounded in Strickland, future claims
birth parents and adoptive family members. The court held this level of in-
vestigation to be reasonable. Id. at 210.
230. Id. (citing McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179, 188 (4th Cir. 2002)).
231. Byram, 339 F.3d at 211.
232. In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the Supreme Court
held that counsel's failure to make a timely motion to suppress evidence
gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment because counsel did not per-
form adequate discovery constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at
383-91. The Court remanded the case because the record was insufficient to
determine the question of prejudice. Id.
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that rely on Wiggins for support are not defeated by the govern-
ment's argument that Wiggins is new law for the purpose of §
2254(d)(1) analysis.
Furthermore, petitioners raising claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel should look to the nature of Wiggins's claim.
Rather than challenge the decision made by counsel, Wiggins chal-
lenged the knowledge that counsel possessed when the decision
was made. Thus, just as Cone could have argued that his counsel
did not possess sufficient knowledge of the prosecutor's ability to
deliver a devastating rebuttal argument, future petitioners may
find more success by challenging the basis for counsel's decisions
rather than the actual decisions. Of course, because of the fact-
finding limitations imposed on federal courts by the AEDPA, the
petitioner must establish a basis for counsel's deficient knowledge
during state postconviction proceedings.
Finally, Wiggins demonstrates that federal courts can probe
into unanswered questions on the state court record. As Justice
O'Connor admitted in the Wiggins opinion, had the state court
clearly identified what counsel knew about Wiggins's background
prior to the sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court would have
been bound to that finding unless rebutted by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence."233 Because the state did not answer the factual
question at issue, the Supreme Court was free to probe into the
knowledge counsel possessed when selecting the trial strategy.
The corollary to the result in Wiggins is that a state court must
not leave factual findings unresolved if the court wants to retain
its presumption of correctness during federal habeas review.
B. The Impact in the Trial Court
While the case will have some impact on how cases are re-
viewed during federal postconviction proceedings, Wiggins is
foremost a case about an individual who did not have a sufficient
opportunity to convince a jury that his life should be spared.
Therefore, perhaps most importantly, Wiggins changes how ap-
pointed counsel will manage capital sentencing cases.
In the Court's opinion, Justice O'Connor concluded that coun-
sel's investigation was unreasonable for two reasons. First, coun-
sel's decision not to look past the PSI or DSS report was
233. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. 2004).
KNOW YOUR CLIENT
unreasonable, regardless of what counsel knew when this decision
was made.234 Second, counsel's decision to forego further investi-
gation beyond the PSI or DSS report was unreasonable based on
what counsel actually knew when the decision was made.
235
Hence, the Court created two means by which future investigatory
decisions may be deemed unreasonable: a per se determination
and a totality of the circumstances determination.
The benefit created with two potential avenues for relief is
readily apparent. First, to avoid a per se determination of unrea-
sonableness, counsel must conduct an investigation of the defen-
dant's background in accordance with the prevailing standards in
the jurisdiction. Additionally, the investigation must go beyond
what is included in standard pre-sentencing reports prepared by
the state prior to the penalty phase of the trial.236 Second, if coun-
sel can articulate any suspicions that justify further investigation
into the defendant's background, and if the mitigating evidence
that might result from further investigation is not "fruitless" or
"counterproductive," counsel must continue the investigation. 237
Most importantly, counsel can argue the language of either
avenue of unreasonableness as explained in Wiggins to receive
additional funding from the state for the purpose of furthering the
investigation of mitigation evidence. On the day after the Su-
preme Court announced the decision in Wiggins, court-appointed
defense counsel in Texas cited to Wiggins "in a request for money
to pay for a mitigation expert" in a capital sentencing case.238 The
judge, although somewhat skeptical of the need for a mitigation
expert, granted counsel up to $2,500 for the purpose of hiring an
expert.239 Thus, in light of Wiggins and the subsequent response
234. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
235. Id. at 525.
236. While the Court does not expressly relate the thoroughness of the in-
vestigation to the proximity of the trial, counsel who does not complete the
investigation of mitigation evidence due to counsel's own mismanagement of
the trial cannot be exempt from a Strickland/Wiggins case law analysis.
Counsel who fails to complete the investigation due to limited time allowed
by the court may prevail in an effective assistance of counsel challenge. Such
a result might, however, violate fundamental fairness.
237. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525.
238. John Council, Defense Lawyers Must Dig Deeper into Death Cases,
TEXAS LAWYER, July 7, 2003, at 1.
239. Id.
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by the trial judge, this argument could and should be made in
every capital sentencing case.
Once funds are available, appointed counsel should pursue, in
order to meet professional standards, the hiring of a mitigation
specialist who "possesses expertise in the monumental task of
identifying, developing and presenting mitigating evidence that
most attorneys do not have."240 While not presently required, the
value of "expert help in fleshing out mitigation issues" may ulti-
mately result in the appointment of mitigation experts as a matter
of course. 241
However, as a strict application of Strickland, Wiggins is not
a panacea. Once the investigation is conducted and counsel has
mitigation evidence available, counsel need only be able to explain
a decision not to use the evidence to defeat an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.
Furthermore, the value of the mitigation evidence before a
jury is uncertain. As a matter of law, the Supreme Court has held
that evidence of a defendant's background and upbringing is
"relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability." 242 "Mitigat-
ing evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury's se-
lection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the
prosecution's death-eligibility case."243 The head of the Texas De-
fender Service in Houston maintains that "[wihen this sort of
mitigating evidence is presented to a jury, it makes a differ-
ence." 244 For example, the introduction of a troubled family history
in a recent Indiana case convinced the jury to reject a death sen-
tence. 245
240. Pamela Blume Leonard, A New Profession for an Old Need: Why a
Mitigation Specialist Must be Included on the Capital Defense Team, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1143, 1151 (2003). Ms. Leonard indicates that "it takes hun-
dreds of hours to conduct a thorough social history investigation...." Id. at
1154.
241. Council, supra note 238.
242. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535.
243. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000).
244. Henry Weinstein, High Court's Term Ends: Man's Death Sentence
Overturned, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at § 1, 31.
245. The impact of the mitigating evidence on the jurors was described as
follows:
A recent article in The New York Times Magazine concerning a
death penalty case in Indiana included an excellent example of a
case in which a defendant's social history was used successfully as a
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However, the jury's use of the evidence may reflect a different
attitude. A jury may interpret the evidence to indicate that the de-
fendant will remain a threat to society even while serving a life
sentence in prison. "[T]he dysfunctional and abused childhood de-
fense is not always successful; judges and juries have condemned
to death defendants with equally tragic childhoods." 246 The fore-
man of Kevin Wiggins's jury stated, after the Supreme Court an-
nounced its decision, that "'it wouldn't have made any difference' if
she had known about his background." 247 She continued: "The
maltreatment he suffered at the hands of his mother was nothing
compared to the maltreatment he inflicted on the woman he mur-
dered .... [Ilt does not excuse him from accepting the conse-
quences of his actions."248 Maryland Attorney General Joseph
Curran also commented on the mitigation evidence and felt that
"'it is equally likely' the jury would have treated evidence about
Wiggins's difficult upbringing as a reason to see him 'as a future
danger.'"249 Such viewpoints may provide future counsel with the
requisite ammunition to justify the decision to leave out such evi-
dence as "counterproductive" 250 or "fruitless" 251 in a sentencing
hearing.252
mitigating factor in sentencing. After hearing about the defendant's
history - which was bad, but not as bad as Wiggins's - the jurors not
only rejected the death penalty, but in subsequent interviews they
'referred to [the defendant] by his first name, as if they were speak-
ing of a family member or a friend.'
Craig M. Bradley, Court Confirms Importance of Mitigation in Sentencing,
TRIAL, Oct. 2003, at 62-63 (citing to Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y.
TIMEs MAGAZINE, July 6, 2003, at 32).
246. Wiggins 11, 724 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832
(1999).
247. Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Orders New Sentence for Maryland
Death Row Inmate, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), June 27, 2003.
248. Id. It is uncertain, and practically impossible to determine, if those
statements truly reflect the outcome that would have occurred had counsel
introduced the abundant quantity of mitigating evidence of Kevin Wiggins's
background. It is possible that the statements were made to reinforce the de-
cision that the jury actually made: to sentence Kevin Wiggins to death.
249. Charles Lane, Death Penalty of Md. Man is Overturned, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2003, at A01.
250. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003).
251. Id.
252. Lending credence to such an argument, during oral argument of Wig-
gins v. Smith, the Supreme Court asked Mr. Verrilli, Wiggins's counsel, the
following question regarding the mitigation evidence available to counsel:
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VI. CONCLUSION
While Wiggins v. Smith reads as a strict application of Strick-
land, it demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to ensure
that defendants are given a fair chance to convince a jury to spare
their lives. Certainly Wiggins's counsel were not intoxicated, ine-
briated, or asleep during the trial, but they provided Kevin Wig-
gins with a poor chance to convince at least one juror that his life
should be spared. Unlike the vast majority of defendants who re-
ceive questionable counsel, Kevin Wiggins now has a second op-
portunity to make that argument to a new jury. Though the next
group of twelve individuals may sentence Kevin Wiggins to death,
they may not. The question is not whether the jury is convinced
that Wiggins deserves to live; the question is whether it reaches
the decision after hearing evidence that effective counsel decides
is relevant. Wiggins's trial counsel was right in her first statement
to the jury: he has had a hard life. But every indigent client who
receives effective representation from appointed counsel in the fu-
ture has Kevin Wiggins to thank.
Wayne M. Helge*
Why couldn't counsel for the defense think if we introduce this, it's
going to be subject to cross-examination? And if we look at that so-
cial history, we find out that the whole thing is - the defendant him-
self was the source of the information about the horrible sexual
abuse he had been exposed to as a child. The jury might find that a
person who had been so abused would be full of hate and therefore
very likely would have had the mental state to carry out this brutal
murder that - in other words, that this kind of information could be
a two-edged sword. The jury could infer from it he's not fully respon-
sible for his acts or, on the other hand, that this person was violent,
full of hate, and indeed committed this brutal murder.
Oral Argument for Wiggins at *21-22, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123
S.Ct. 2527 (2003) (No. 02-311), available at 2003 WL 1699820. Such a justifi-
cation could either be a post hoc rationalization or a legitimate reason. It will
be up to the state court to determine which is the truth. If the state court
makes a specific finding, federal habeas relief will be available only if the
state court factual determination is rebutted by clear and convincing evi-
dence or if the legal conclusion is objectively unreasonable.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Andrew Horwitz for his effective
counsel, insight and guidance throughout the writing of this Note.
